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1 Introduction 
The complexity of the current international financial system and the different way of  understanding it 
made very difficult  identifying and solving vulnerabilities that characterize the current economic 
system. 
However, after the crises of the last decade of the twentieth century in Latin America and South East 
Asia, it has increased the interest of specialists in the prevention of systemic crises. Although in 
economic literature there is a classification by types of crises, in practice we cannot support the idea 
that a crisis occurred in a country belonging to a particular type of the set (currency, banking, fiscal, 
foreign debt). Therefore, experts call into question the theoretical concept: twin crises. Thus, there 
may be and currency crises and banking crises as in Asia (1997-1998), the Russian crisis (1998) and 
there may be foreign debt and currency crises in Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), Argentina (2001). 
In modern economic theory we across a variety of models that analyze financial crises and their 
impact on the real economy. Given the events, the forms, causes and effects of these crises, those who 
analyzed them classified them into three generations of models. The first generation models of 
financial crises, introduced by Paul Krugman in 1979 and developed in 1984 by Robert P. Flood and 
Peter M. Garbe, refers to fixed exchange rates to fluctuate around those limits as well as explicit 
speculative attacks on them. 
According to the first generation of models, under a fixed exchange rate, well above the massive 
expansion of credit money demand, gradually reduces the international reserves and ultimately 
speculative attacks on exchange rates. Investors know that their incomes will suffer losses if they 
continue to have currency they sell it when the exchange rate would exist in conditions where it would 
not be fixed (shadow exchange rate) is equal to that fixed on the currency market. 
Following these actions, foreign reserves are depleted, and the fixed exchange rate is abandoned. 
Researches carried out after the Gulcin F. Ozkan and Alan Sutherland in 1995, shows that the 
authorities give up the fixed exchange rate and due to other variables, not only decrease of the 
reserves. When a country carries a fixed exchange rate, increase in international interest rates 
implicitly leads to increased domestic interest rate. A high level of domestic interest rate increases 
financing costs for that country. Thus, in a large public debt, they will argue for abandoning the fixed 
exchange rate. Moreover, higher interest rates weaken domestic banking system and the authorities 
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must devalue the currency to avoid collapse which it would be more expensive. (Chang & Velasco, 
1999, p. 11) 
In this first generation of models we can fit the crises in Latin America, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil. 
Speaking the above crises, abandonment of fixed exchange rates was followed by significant losses 
suffered by the banking system, massive central bank intervention in the forex market, imposing 
restrictions on capital mobility. 
A second generation of models was introduced in 1994 by Maurice Obstfeld and he analyzes how the 
government chooses to respond to changes in private sector behavior. Unlike the first generation of 
models that focus on linearity behavior of public and private sector, the second generation of models is 
based on nonlinear behavior of economic agents. (Obstfeld, 1994, p. 201) 
The third generation of models initiated by Paul Krugman (1999), Roberto Chang and Andreas 
Velasco (1999), Philippe Aghion (2001) combines the first two models and focus on private sector 
balance sheets in particular firms or banks with debt currency. Krugman (1999) refers mainly to a 
small open economy that used to produce a homogeneous good two factors of production, labor and 
capital according to a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
This generation of models was developed after the crises in Southeast Asia considered being part of 
the third generation of models. 
Most crises in this region were not based on monetary or fiscal policy expansionary or abandonment 
of fixed exchange rates by the authorities (characteristic of the crisis in the first two generations of 
models), unemployment and inflation were within normal limits. The real problems that led to the 
triggering of the crisis were the balance sheets of banks and firms. One aspect of this crisis is moral 
hazard, based on strong links between financial institutions and governments that yielded the 
imprudent behavior from creditors, bad investment decisions and excessive indebtedness. 
 
2 The Economic Crises of the Last Two Decades 
Economic and financial crises of the past two decades, and the imbalances caused by these made 
experts in the field to reassess the role of international finance in the global economy. Roots of these 
crises, both economic and financial, are common, highlighting features depending on vulnerabilities 
and economic policies of each countries who faced such economic shocks. 
Analysis of main causes of these crises are identified as follows: 
a) Disorderly Capital account liberalization  
Capital account liberalization in the existence of disorder financial economic system, increased the 
volatility of macroeconomic events that led to the currency and banking crises in Latin America 
(Mexico, Argentina, Brazil), South East Asia (1997), Russia (1999), Turkey (2000). 
b) engaging a fixed exchange rate regime 
The danger of a fixed exchange rate regime practiced in emerging countries and we refer to crises in 
the last two decades, has resulted in crises that revealed the  vulnerabilities of  financial sector. Most 
of the crises started with the devaluation of national currency as a result of unsustainable monetary 
policies as the case of Mexico (1994), Argentina (2001) or due to increased speculative pressure on the 
national currency as it was the case of Thailand, South Korea (1997) and Russia (1998). 
c) the unsustainability of the current account deficit 
Most countries in South East Asia were faced with excessive current account deficits, financed mainly 
by attracting foreign capital flows for the short term. With capital mobility, most times, authorities 
lose control over monetary policy, and such an economy is more vulnerable to external shocks. 
d) huge foreign debt 
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Sometimes, full mobility of capital is reflected in the indebtedness of countries that lead to external 
debt crises as was the case of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, South Korea, where the external debt 
crisis overlapped the currency crisis. 
e) increase interest rates 
Liquidity problems arising in the financial system in Latin America have increased nominal interest 
rates and for South East Asia, it originally was intended as a measure to avoid the crisis proposed by 
the IMF, later becoming one of the causes which precipitated deepening crisis. 
f) investment boom that led to overgrowth default volume of credit 
As for actual economic and financial crisis, foreign investors and local euphoria following the rapid 
growth of asset prices led to increased lending often speculative purposes leaving countries more 
vulnerable to changes in credit availability. 
Carelessness shown by the lenders in providing loans and then,  East Asian crisis and now,  the current 
crisis, shows that ignoring basic rules of caution is a serious and old problem that caused the most 
economic and financial crisis. 
g) Poor regulation of the economy 
Another factor contributing to the onset of most crises is the lack of an appropriate regulatory 
framework for companies and banks which allow developing unhealthy and corrupt links. This is true 
for the current crisis and the South East Asia, especially for South Korea. 
In addition, at the origin of the crises we find causes which are less visible such as panic investors 
facing uncertainty, or large changes occurring in people's attitudes that Keynes called them 
manifestations of "animal spirit". All these irrational facts are encouraged by moral hazard that is the 
major cause of gravity of financial crises. 
Although many economists have considered these crises, serious threats to international economic and 
financial stability there have been others who have considered small problems of domestic economy 
without affecting global macroeconomic stability. 
Because of disputes, experts and policy makers have not agreed at that time, about the root causes of 
these crises (debate on this issue have held today) or on economic policies and reforms necessary to 
limit the negative effects prevention of future crises. 
Financial crises of the 1990s were a surprise to many specialists even for IMF that, based on economic 
performance in previous decades, especially in East Asia,  predicted for this region  a very strong 
growth. 
Besides the common causes that led to the onset of these crises, each of them have specific causes 
related by the characteristics and vulnerabilities of each economy and economic policies adopted. 
As a feature of Latin American crisis, it was also caused by massive government spending, relaxed 
monetary policy leading to higher budget deficits and inflation. 
In contrast, Southeast Asian countries had budget surpluses and low inflation. A major problem in 
these countries was the high indebtedness of corporations (as was the case in South Korea industrial 
corporations). Other specific causes of crises from these regions were increased dependence on 
external financing in the short term, high prices of assets, especially real estate, crisis trigger being 
identical to the current crisis. 
Causes of economic and financial crises were joined political causes that have hastened their outset, 
Mexico (1994), Indonesia (1997). 
The Mexican economy problem was excessive value of the peso which made domestic goods prices 
exceed the competitiveness of the other markets. This has resulted in significant loss of exports and 
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imports. On the other hand, a current account deficit was not threatening the Mexican dollar reserves 
due to considerably increased by the end of 1993. 
Mexican financial crisis of 1994 began with the devaluation of the peso resulting in more expensive 
debt in dollar, which caused serious problems with the solvency of the Mexic. Wanting to protect the 
national currency, the authorities decided to increase interest rates which caused an explosion in the 
cost of credit, weakening balance sheets of banks. 
Precipitation of political and economic phenomena has reduced foreign exchange reserves in just four 
weeks with 11 billion dollars. 
Failure in adopting of prudential norms by Mexican banks meant increased the bad loans in their 
portfolio. 
After these events, followed the peso crises. The Interest rates have increased rapidly, the peso 
plummeted and Mexico was tightened credit market. In short time Mexico lost its reputation as the 
government's ability to maintain a stable exchange rate and sound financial policy. 
Asian crisis started in Thailand in 1997 and spread rapidly and violently on the first countries in Asia 
and then Russia, Argentina, Brazil both by the commercial and finance channel. 
Currency crisis, accompanied by a crisis of confidence and inadaptability structural measures have led 
to slower growth in this country for a long period of time. 
After the currency crisis in Thailand, contagion effects have become more visible when the crisis was 
spreading rapidly from an emerging country to another. 
In 1997, Indonesia's economy, like that of Thailand, seemed a healthy but, unlike Thailand, Indonesia 
had low inflation rate, a solid banking sector, a commercial surplus and  reserves by over 20 billion 
dollars. 
Violence with which the crisis hit Indonesia was caused mostly by the economic problems faced Asian 
countries (Japan, South Korea, Thailand only a month) following the withdrawal of capital from this 
region which, practically it was the only engine of economic growth. 
Along with performances of Indonesian economy, and some vulnerabilities have been identified which 
favored the crisis spread to this country: strong capital inflows associated with foreign debt growth 
since 1994, a fragile banking system as a result of cronyism and corruption and interventionist policies 
such as "family capitalism" that has strangled the free market economy. 
In November 1997, South Korea, the second largest economic and industrial power in the region, 
member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, seemed to be spared the 
financial problems faced by emerging countries in Asia. However, at the end of 1997, the existence of 
structural similarities and contagion force extended the crisis this country. 
To support large industrial concerns (chaebol) and make them globally competitive, Korea turned to 
short-term loans denominated in foreign currency without thinking about the dangers of increasing 
interest rates and depreciation. In fact, some of these large industrial corporations, due to huge debts, 
went bankrupt before the crisis. 
However, depreciation of national currency, the large number of bankruptcies of industrial 
corporations and the inability of government, have led to huge recession. 
Another country that has not escaped the contagion effect through the financial channel has been 
Malaysia. 
In the mid of 1997, after the crisis broke in Thailand, Malaysia has faced some financial market 
shocks. The main vulnerabilities of Malaysia were fall of the capital market by almost 50% by the end 
of the year and  a large deficit and capital account. Were worrying also growing domestic demand as a 
result of too lax lending, increasing asset prices and their impact on the banking system. 
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Two other less affected countries by the Asian crisis were the Philippines and Singapore. 
Although we cannot speak of a miracle for this country, as was a moderate economic growth, 
structural reforms have been well implemented, especially in the trade and investment sector. Trade 
liberalization and privatization of large companies has been made in normal and prudent 
macroeconomic policies led to the economic recovery in the years that followed. 
About the crisis in South East Asia countries, many mistakes are attributed to policies adopted by the 
International Monetary Fund: 
1. encourage these countries to liberalize as quickly as financial and capital markets; 
2. promoting measures based on increasing interest rates which, under a high degree of leverage, 
it has facilitated the road to collapse; 
3. promotion of strict fiscal policy while the East Asian countries had no imbalances. Thus the 
IMF imposed austerity measures deepened the crisis. 
Asian crisis, when installed, was transmitted through contagion, both commercial and financial 
channel to other regions and even on other continents. 
Financial sector problems were quickly sent to the real sector causing lower imports with a real 
negative effect on international trade. 
Import volume contraction in Asian countries affected by crisis have contributed to lower demand for 
exports to Japan, Russia and Latin American (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru). Not only was affected 
but traded volume and price of products. 
Through financial contagion manifested by foreign and local investors panic that affected sources of 
capital, the Asian crisis was rapidly transmitted to neighboring countries: Indonesia, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea. 
As a result of financial interdependence, the Asian crisis was also sent off continent, having a negative 
impact on the country extremely sensitive to movements of capital as Russia, Brazil, Argentina. 
Argentina's currency regime and its connection to the international financial system are likely to 
explain not only the Argentine crisis but before the period of rapid growth and strengthen its financial 
system. 
But Argentina had a huge foreign debt and to cover them need new government loans. 
Fixed exchange rate made imports cheaper, generating a progressive worsening foreign reserves, and 
Argentina's industrial infrastructure which eventually led to high unemployment. 
Departure of foreign capital in Argentina had a strong impact on it. Crisis of confidence from foreign 
investors threaten the stability of the banking system. With the onset of the crisis has been increasing 
country risk, which was reflected in lower stock prices and liquidity problems arising in the Argentine 
financial system was responsible for the increase in nominal interest rates. 
The crisis that crushed Argentina for several years was accompanied by external shocks as the 
Brazilian real devaluation and international revaluation of the dollar. This decreased competitiveness 
of Argentina before his partners, the largest being Brazil and the euro area. 
Argentina’s real depreciation against the U.S. dollar pulled down a large economy like that of Brazil. 
But the Brazilian crisis has its original, a few years ago, in 1994, with implementation of the "Real 
Plan". 
In 2001 the Brazilian economy showed signs that it recovers, recording a growth rate of almost 4%. 
But the Argentine crisis and internal problems both economic and political caused again a slowdown 
of macroeconomic indicators. 
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In Russia, the contagion effects had a greater impact, Russian crisis was a combination of a currency 
crisis and a sovereign debt crisis. 
Decline in commodity prices, especially crude oil following the collapse that swept East Asian 
countries had a devastating impact on the Russian economy. Russia was the largest exporter of crude 
oil and tax revenues were an important part of the state budget. 
Deep roots of the crisis in Russia are found in the country's economic structure, institutional 
environment, and policy makers at the political level. Analysis of the Russian crisis of 1998 reveals 
many common points with the Asian crisis and Latin American countries. 
Poor management by the Kremlin of the transition process since 1990, reflected by  the financial 
markets and trade liberalization to foreign investors has exposed existing vulnerabilities and failures of 
internal and external economic policies. 
All these macroeconomic problems  was added a huge debt and increasing interest rates following the 
crisis in East Asia has made more difficult the economic situation of Russia. 
Overvalued exchange rate, trade balance deficit, the country's inability to produce consumer goods and 
lower investment led economy towards a major crisis. 
Even if economic shock was strong enough, shortly after the devaluation of the ruble, Russia's 
economy began to recover shyly registering positive growth rates of macroeconomic indicators. 
Recovery was installed much faster than expected economic analysts and international organizations. 
The main and most important reason of recovery Russian economy was growing demand for oil and 
its price. 
Measures were taken to overcome the crisis and return to growth economies were different from one 
country to another depending on the nature and specifics of the crisis. Most countries have turned to 
IMF for financial assistance. 
In Latin American countries main measures to help the financial institutions were: 
 a. reduction in public expenditure; 
 b. increase in tax revenues; 
 c. exports stimulation; 
 d. stimulating domestic consumption by replacing imports with domestic goods and services; 
 e. fiscal and monetary tightening; 
With regard to Southeast Asia, measures have been taken: 
 a. devaluation of national currency; 
 b. recapitalization of banks; 
 c. financial restructuring of troubled companies; 
 d. exports stimulation; 
 e. austere fiscal policy (elimination of subsidies, higher prices). 
In Malaysia, which it did not adopt an IMF-supported program, measures were quickly successful, 
being the first country to economic growth after the crisis. Authorities were concerned with 
stimulating employment, financial restructuring of enterprises and ensure a continuous funding stream.  
(Stiglitz, 2006, p. 153) 
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3 Conclusions 
Even if there were signals of those outbreaks of crisis, investors have underestimated the risk 
associated with the high expected returns, existing a large discrepancy between perceived risk and 
country risk indicators. (Bari, 2010, p. 403) 
Crises in Latin America, East Asia, Russia and the mechanisms by which a crisis has spread from 
country to country and even to another continent would have to draw a strong warning, or if there was, 
it certainly was ignored. 
Imbalances in economic and financial systems of these countries and unsustainable economic policies 
played a major role in the changes in their fragility trade flows and facilitating the spread of financial 
crises over the world. 
Lessons learned from the external dimension of the crises in East Asia, Latin America, Russia stands 
out clearly exuberance and irrational behavior of investors in terms of entry and exit to and from 
emerging markets. To these is added the lack of transparency and lack of information on existing 
structural weaknesses in the emerging and the developed economies. 
 
4 References 
Akerlof A. George & Shiller J. Robert (2010). Spirite animale – Despre felul în care psihologia umană influențează 
economia și ce înseamnă asta pentru capitalismul global/ Animal Spirits - About how human psychology affects the economy 
and what that means for global capitalism. Bucharest: Editura Publica.  
Antonopoulus, Rania (2009). The Curent Economic and Financial Crisis: A Gendre Perspective. The Levy Economics 
Institute oh Bord College. Working Paper No. 562, May. 
Bari, I. T. (2010). Tratat de economie politică globală/Treaty of global political economy. Bucharest: Economica. 
Chang, R., & Velasco, A. (1999). Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy. NBER Working Paper No. 7272, 
11.  
Chiodo J. Abbigail, Owyang T. Michel (2002). A Case Study of a Currency Crisis: The Russian Default of 1998. 
EconPapers, November, pp.7-18. 
Dabos Marcelo & Mera Gomez Laura (1998). The Tequila Banking Crisis in Argentina, Published in Banking Crises: Large-
Scale Failures, Massive Government Intervention, Benton E. Gup (editor), Quorum Press, Victoria, Argentina, September. 
Enoch Charles, Baldwin Barbara, Frecaut Olivier, Kovanen Arturo (2001). Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis. Two 
Years of Living Dangerously 1997-99. IMF Working Paper. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department.  
Flood, Robert & Nancy, Marion (1998). Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis Literature. Working paper no. 6380, 
NBER 
Masson R. Paul (1999). Multiple Equilibrium, Contagion and the Emerging Market Crises. International Monetary Fund, 
Research Department, Washington, D.C. 20431, 20 August. 
Obstfeld, M. (1994). The Logic of Currency Crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires, Bank of France, Vol. 43, 189-213. 
Stiglitz, J. (2006). Globalizarea. Speranțe și deziluzii/Globalization. Hope and disillusionment. Bucharest: Economica. 
Wlaker W. Cristopher (1998). Contagion: How the Asian Crisis Spread. Economics and Development Resource Center, 
Asian Development Bank, Number 3, October. 
 
